This paper analyzes the relationship between …scal multipliers and …scal positions of governments using an Interactive Panel Vector Auto Regression model and a large dataset of advanced and developing economies. Our methodology permits us to trace the endogenous relationship between …scal multipliers and …scal positions while maintaining enough degrees of freedom to draw sharp inferences. We report three major results. First, the …scal multipliers depend on …scal positions: the multipliers tend to be larger when …scal positions are strong (i.e. when government debt and de…cits are low) than weak. For instance, the long run multiplier can be as large as unity when …scal position is strong, while it can be negative when the …scal position is weak. Second, these e¤ects are separate and distinct from the impact of the business cycle on the …scal multiplier. Third, the state-dependent e¤ects of the …scal position on multipliers is attributable to two factors: an interest rate channel through which higher borrowing costs, due to investors'increased perception of credit risks when stimulus is implemented from a weak initial …scal position, crowd out private investment; and, a Ricardian channel through which households reduce consumption in anticipation of future …scal adjustments.
Introduction
During the Great Recession of 2008-09, many countries around the world -both advanced and developing -deployed …scal policy to support activity. As a result, government debt and de…cits increased in many countries, and they remain elevated (Huidrom, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2016) . Against this backdrop of weak …scal positions, there has been a revival of interest in …scal policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. Yet, there is scant evidence regarding the extent to which …scal policy is e¤ective in stimulating the economy during times of weak …scal position. The objective of this paper is to …ll this gap in the literature. In particular, we ask: do …scal multipliers depend on …scal positions?
The question we study follows the …nding in recent literature that an "average" …scal multiplier which is assumed to apply universally is irrelevant and that multipliers depend on speci…c macroeconomic conditions. For instance, beginning with the work of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), recent papers have established that multipliers tend to be larger during recessions than during expansions (Bachmann and Sims 2012; Candelon and Lieb 2013; Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy 2013). The notion that …scal multipliers depend on the state of the business cycle is well grounded in theory. During recessions, the multiplier e¤ect from government spending can rise due to slack in labor markets, larger frictions in …nancial markets, and an increase in liquidity constrained agents. 1 The literature has, thus far, o¤ered a convincing case that the phase of the business cycle should be regarded as a key conditioning state that may in ‡uence the e¢ cacy of …scal policy.
Economic theory, however, does not limit the conditioning state to the phase of the business cycle alone. In fact, theory suggests that …scal position of the government, as distinct from the business cycle, can be another important determining factor for the size of …scal multipliers. This state-dependency of multipliers on …scal position can operate via two channels. First, a Ricardian channel: when a government with a weak …scal position implements a …scal stimulus, households expect tax increases sooner than in an economy with strong …scal position (Sutherland 1997; Perroti 1999) . The perceived negative wealth e¤ect encourages households to cut consumption and save, thereby weakening the impact of the policy on output. Thus, the net e¤ects of …scal policy on output, the size of the …scal multiplier, may be negligible or even negative. Second, an interest rate channel: when the …scal position is weak, …scal stimulus can increase lenders' perceptions of sovereign credit risk. This raises sovereign bond yields and hence, borrowing costs across the whole economy. This, in turn, crowds out private investment and consumption, reducing the size of the multiplier. Therefore, both channels suggest that …scal policy is less e¤ective when the …scal stimulus is implemented from a weak initial …scal position. 2 1 These e¤ects may be further ampli…ed in the special case where monetary policy is also constrained by the zero lower bound (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh 2013; Erceg and Linde 2014). In advanced economies, …scal policy has received much attention given the crisis-induced zero lower bound environment that has constrained conventional monetary policy (Blanchard et al. 2010 and 2013; Delong and Summers 2012). 2 Sutherland (1997) formalizes the Ricardian channel by postulating that there exists a debt threshold at which the government makes …scal adjustments, via increasing taxes, to remain solvent. Thus, households expect higher taxes to be more eminent when the government conducts an expansionary …scal policy from a high initial level of debt. In Perotti (1999) , such expectations of higher taxes can also result in increased tax distortions which are an additional source of negative wealth e¤ects. With regard to the interest rate channel, Bi, Shen, and Yang (2014) theoretically establish that sovereign risk premia can increase nonlinearly as government indebtedness rises. Corsetti et al. (2013) highlight the interest rate is particularly relevant when monetary policy is constrained, for instance during a zero lower bound episode. 2 To estimate …scal multipliers that depend on the …scal position, we use an Interacted Panel Vector Autoregressive (IPVAR) model. 3 The model is essentially an extension of an otherwise standard panel structural VAR (SVAR), with the distinction that the VAR coe¢ cients interact with (observable) state variables. Consequently, these coe¢ cients become time-varying, and evolve endogenously according to these states. This results in a framework where the VAR dynamics and hence, the …scal multipliers are conditional on the state variables which we take to be the …scal position.
More importantly, since the state-dependency is captured by making use of the full sample, this nonlinear approach allows us to maintain enough degrees of freedom, thus allowing us to draw sharper inferences. This feature of the model is particularly useful when conditioning on multiple states of interest: a feature we exploit when we jointly condition on the …scal position and the phase of the business cycle. The latter exercise allows us to evaluate whether the …scal position is a unique state, di¤erent from the phase of the business cycle, which determines the size of the …scal multipliers.
Applying our empirical methodology to a large dataset that covers 34 countries (19 advanced and 15 developing), at the quarterly frequency over the period 1980:1 -2014:1, we empirically establish that the …scal position is a key conditioning state that determines the size of the …scal multipliers. In particular, estimated multipliers are systematically smaller when the …scal position is weak (i.e. government debt is low), and vice versa when it is strong. In addition, we show that the state-dependency of multipliers on the …scal position is independent of business cycle e¤ects. That is, while we …nd multipliers to be larger during recessions than expansions (consistent with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012b), the weaker (stronger) multiplier e¤ect that derives from a weak (strong) …scal position applies even when the economy is experiencing a recession or an expansion.
Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that such state-dependent e¤ects operate through the two channels highlighted above. When the government conducts expansionary …scal policy during times of high debt, the private sector scales back on consumption in credible anticipation of future tax pressures due to the weak state of public …nances (Ricardian channel) and private investment is suppressed plausibly due to an increase in economy-wide interest rate as perceptions of heightened sovereign risk become stronger (interest rate channel).
Some recent empirical studies have documented the importance of …scal positions for …scal multipliers. For instance, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) include measures of …scal fragility in their analyses of multipliers. However, …scal considerations are not the centerpiece of their analysis, and so they apply only certain debt thresholds, as opposed to our more general stance that allows these thresholds to emerge naturally from the data. Using a similar IPVAR approach like ours, Nickel and Tudyka (2014) provide estimates of multipliers that depend on the …scal position for highincome European economies. However, they do not distinguish between the state of the business cycle and …scal position. There is, therefore, an indeterminacy over whether the state-dependency of the multipliers is uniquely attributable to the latter. Using a di¤erent econometric methodology than ours, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) discuss the joint conditioning exercise and …nd that large government debt reduces the stimulative e¤ects of expansionary …scal policy even during recessions. But their identi…cation strategy requires data on government consumption forecast errors, which essentially limits their study to only OECD countries.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, by clearly distinguishing between the state of the business cycle and the …scal position, we establish that the …scal position is a unique state that determines the size of the …scal multiplier. Second, we show the empirical relevance of the transmission mechanisms that underlay the state-dependent e¤ects due to …scal position: the Ricardian channel and the interest rate channel. Third, compared to previous studies, our sample includes a larger set of countries covering advanced and developing economies, thus providing a general result on the state-dependent e¤ects due to …scal position.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology. Here, we discuss the IPVAR model, the identi…cation strategy, and the database. We present estimates of state-dependent multipliers in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the transmission mechanisms that highlight the Ricardian and the interest rate channels. Section 5 discusses robustness exercises and Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Methodology

Econometric Model
A standard panel structural VAR (SVAR) estimates a single set of parameters which then yields an "average" or unconditional multiplier. Our objective is to go beyond the unconditional multiplier, and investigate how multipliers can depend on speci…c macroeconomic conditions, in particular …scal position of governments. For that, we deploy the Interacted Panel Vector Autoregressive (IPVAR) model where the main innovation, with respect to a standard panel SVAR, is that the model coe¢ cients vary deterministically according to conditioning (state) variables. Thus, the IPVAR results in a framework where model dynamics and hence, estimated multipliers are conditional on the state variables. By choosing the conditioning variable to be a measure of …scal position in the IPVAR, we estimate multipliers that depend on …scal position.
The IPVAR model, in its structural form, is represented by: (1) where for a given country i in period t, gc represents real government consumption, gdp real gross domestic product (GDP), reer the real e¤ective exchange rate, and ca current account balance (as a share of GDP).
We take government consumption as the …scal instrument and we track the e¤ects of …scal policy in terms of GDP. Separately, we check the robustness of our results by tracking …scal outcomes in terms of private consumption and private investment (Section 4). Real e¤ective exchange rate and the current account are included in the model to account for open economy features that characterize most of the countries in our sample. The matrix X captures additional controls, which include the time-invariant country …xed e¤ects, and U is a vector of uncorrelated, i:i:d: (structural) shocks. The shock corresponding to government consumption is the …scal shock. Following Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), we set the lag length as L = 4. 4
The impact matrix A 0 (matrix of coe¢ cients on the left hand side of Equation (1)) is lower triangular. This along with the ordering of the variables in the VAR is related to our identi…cation scheme (discussed in detail in the next section). Both the impact matrix A 0 and the coe¢ cient matrices A l , l = 1; : : : ; L (on the right-hand side of Equation (1)) comprises time-varying model coe¢ cients that, for any given entry in row j and column k, evolve deterministically according to: jk l;it = jk 1;l + jk 2;l f s it ;
(
where f s refers to the …scal position. 5 Our baseline measure of the …scal position is the government debt-to-GDP ratio. While the literature has used a variety of measures in this regard, our choice is in line with theoretical macro models, where government debt is the modal state variable. 6 Since measures of …scal position are endogenous and move in tandem with the business cycle, we take lagged moving averages of all our …scal measures to control for business cycle e¤ects. 7 Equations (1) and (2) jointly denote the IPVAR system. When the law of motion in Equation (2) is suppressed, the IPVAR reduces to a standard panel SVAR which we use to estimate the unconditional multipliers. The latter serve as a baseline against which we compare the conditional multipliers from the IPVAR.
The matrices A l , l = 0; : : : ; L determine the e¤ects of structural shocks on the dynamics of endogenous variables in the VAR system. By conditioning the law of motion of the coe¢ cients in these matrices on the …scal position, as in Equation (2), we are allowing those e¤ects to depend on the …scal position. This scheme allows us to calculate impulse responses and hence estimates of …scal multipliers conditional on a given level of …scal position. 8 When estimating the VAR system, we make use of the full sample. This enables us to circumvent the degrees-of-freedom challenge that limits the ability of existing empirical models to account for joint conditioning on multiple states.
As standard in the literature, we compute the cumulative …scal multiplier at horizon T as the discounted cumulative change in output until horizon T , as the discounted cumulative government consumption increases by one unit. That is,
(3)
where r denotes the interest rate. We utilize the median short-term rate in the sample for this purpose which is about 7.4 percent.
From (3), the impact multiplier is obtained by setting T = 0 and the long-run multiplier by setting T at an arbitrarily large number, which is taken to be T = 20 (5 years) in our exercise. At T = 20, impulse responses in our model by and large revert to their unconditional means, and so we take this to be representative of the long run. In addition, we speci…cally report multipliers corresponding to one-year (T = 4) and 2-year (T = 8) horizons, when the …scal multipliers typically peak. To calculate the …scal multiplier using the coe¢ cient estimates from the IPVAR, we …rst cumulate the discounted impulses of output and government consumption at di¤erent horizons and compute the ratio of the two impulses. That ratio is then multiplied by the average government consumption to GDP ratio in the sample to yield multipliers. 9 
Identi…cation and Estimation
To identify …scal shocks, we rely on the standard recursive identi…cation scheme of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . The key timing assumption in this scheme is that discretionary …scal policy does not respond to macroeconomic conditions within the quarter. 10 Such a timing assumption can be motivated by implementation lags typically associated with discretionary …scal policy. In the VAR model, this timing assumption is achieved by ordering government consumption …rst in Equation (1), before GDP. The timing assumption for the remaining variables in the VAR follows Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013): the current account is ordered before the real e¤ective exchange rates. This ordering implies that GDP does not respond to the current account within one quarter, and that the current account does not respond within one quarter when the real e¤ective exchange rate moves. The precise ordering of the latter two variables is, however, immaterial for our main results. Of course, there are alternative identi…cation schemes used in the literature. For instance, Romer and Romer (2010) use a narrative approach to identify exogenous …scal shocks for the US. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) proxy exogenous …scal shocks by forecast errors of government consumption for OECD countries. Due to data limitations, neither of these approaches is feasible for our sample that includes developing countries. 11
The IPVAR system, comprising Equations (1) and (2), is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) applied separately to each equation. 12 The estimated system yields model coe¢ cients that depend on the …scal position such that a given level of the …scal position maps out to a set of model coe¢ cients. For presenting the results, we evaluate model coe¢ cients at speci…c values of the …scal position which are taken to be the percentiles within the sample. Con…dence bands are calculated by bootstrapping over 300 iterations. We report median estimates, along with the 16 -84 percent con…dence bands.
Database
Our main database comprises an unbalanced panel that covers 34 countries (19 advanced and 15 developing), at the quarterly frequency over the period 1980:1 -2014:1. 13 Real government consumption and real GDP are based on the quarterly database in Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) which are extended until 2014:1 by splicing from the OECD and Haver Analytics. Real e¤ective exchange rates are from the narrow (wherever available) and broad indices of the BIS, and current account from the IMF's WEO database. The short-term rate used for discounting the multiplier is drawn mainly from the IMF's IFS database. For the robustness results, we augment this database to include quarterly real private consumption and private investment series. These are drawn from the OECD, Haver Analytics, and Eurostat. Additional details on the sources and de…nitions of all of these variables are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The government consumption and GDP series (as well as private consumption and private investment) are converted into logarithmic form, and detrended using a linear quadratic trend as in Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013). The exchange rate is transformed into quarter-to-quarter growth rates, and the current account series is seasonally-adjusted using the X11 routine. All these series are detrended and demeaned on a country-by-country basis, which e¤ectively controls for country …xed e¤ects in the regressions.
We also employ another database that is an unbalanced panel with the same cross sectional and time series coverage as before but at the annual frequency. This includes the conditioning variables that are not explicitly required for the identi…cation scheme to be valid in the VAR model but are necessary to estimate the interaction terms. These are government debt and …scal balances as percentage of GDP which are drawn from the IMF's WEO (October 2014) database; and government consumption-to-GDP ratios which we obtain from the World Bank's WDI database.
Results
Unconditional Multipliers
To establish a benchmark, we …rst report estimates of the unconditional multiplier from a standard panel SVAR. For that, we suppress the law of motion for the coe¢ cients in Equation (2). This renders the coe¢ cient matrices Al in Equation (1) invariant across countries and time. Figure  1 presents the unconditional multipliers for the select horizons: on impact, 1 year, 2 years, and long run (5 years). Barring only a few periods in the impulse horizon, the unconditional impulse responses of output due to a positive …scal shock are either negative or insigni…cant. 14 Indeed, across all horizons considered, the uncertainty surrounding these estimates is su¢ ciently large such that the multiplier is essentially statistically indistinguishable from zero. This echoes the often small and the wide range in the estimates of the …scal multipliers as reported in previous studies (see Batini and Weber (2014) for a survey). The unconditional impulse responses presented in Figure  2 corroborate the small and imprecise estimates of the e¤ects that …scal policy has on activity on an average. The main message we take away from above is that the unconditional multipliers can mask important state-dependencies as suggested by theory. The estimates of unconditional multipliers suggest that …scal policy, on average, has no stimulative e¤ects on the economy. However, as recent empirical work shows, …scal policy can be stimulative during speci…c times, for instance during recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012b) . Accordingly, we turn, in the following section, to our conditional multiplier estimates. Figure 3 presents the set of estimated …scal multipliers (on the vertical axis) that depend on government debt (on the horizontal axis) -our baseline measure of …scal position. 15 The four panels correspond to the four horizons previously selected. The …gure shows that there is a systematic link between the size of the multiplier and the …scal position: the median value of the multiplier decreases monotonically in debt, for all horizons reported. That is, the estimated multipliers for all the horizons are positive and signi…cant for low levels of debt, but turn negative or insigni…cant when debt levels are high. For instance, the long run multiplier is close to unity when debt is low (strong …scal position), but is negative for high levels of debt (weak …scal position). 16 The di¤erence in the estimated multipliers for low and high levels of debt is particularly signi…cant at longer horizons. Our empirical results therefore lend support to the theoretical insights of earlier studies which show that a weak …scal position can result in stronger crowding-out e¤ects, blunting the stimulative e¤ects of …scal policy (Sutherland 1997 Compared with the unconditional multipliers (Figure 1 ), the conditional multipliers paint a more nuanced picture of the e¤ects of …scal policy. For instance, at the 1-year horizon, the unconditional multiplier is small and insigni…cant. The estimated conditional multipliers at the same horizon ( Figure 3 ) highlight that much of those small and insigni…cant average e¤ects actually re ‡ect episodes when …scal positions are weak. On the other hand, when the …scal position is strong, the conditional …scal multipliers are not only larger than the unconditional estimates but they are also statistically di¤erent from zero.
Fiscal Position-Dependent Multipliers
To better grasp the economics underlying these results, it is useful to examine the conditional impulse responses associated with expansionary …scal policy. For the purpose of illustration, we consider impulse responses conditional on two levels of debt: one corresponding to the 10th percentile in the sample (strong …scal position) and the other corresponds to the 90th percentile (weak …scal position). For comparability, the shock size in each case is normalized such that government consumption rises by 1 percentage point on impact. The conditional impulses are shown in Figure  4 .
While output increases on impact and remains signi…cantly positive for around 2 years when the …scal position is strong, such stimulative e¤ects dissipate after about a year with output falling signi…cantly below zero through till the end of the projection horizon. 18 In the case of government consumption, the conditional impulses for both strong and weak …scal positions exhibit some persistence in response to the positive …scal shock. However, …scal expansion is more quickly unwound when the …scal position is strong than weak. In other words, relative to the strong …scal position, the government in fact spends more, especially during the initial periods, when …scal position is weak. 19 Despite this, it is then quite remarkable that output falls more during times of weak …scal position. This is a result that reinforces our earlier point that a weak …scal position can blunt the stimulative e¤ects of expansionary …scal policy.
Distinguishing between Two States: Business Cycle and Fiscal Position
Recent studies (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012a) have established that …scal multipliers depend on the phase of the business cycle: they tend to be larger during recessions than expansions. To the extent that …scal position is endogenous and varies according to the business cycle, it is possible that our empirical exercise so far of conditioning only on debt is simply capturing business cycle e¤ects. Controlling for business cycle e¤ects is therefore important to establish that …scal position is a unique state that matters for the size of the …scal multipliers. In this section, we undertake a multi-pronged sequence of empirical exercises designed to demonstrate this.
First, we tabulate a number of descriptive statistics to verify that there is little relationship between incidences of the two states. The top panel of Table 1 computes the relative frequency in which countries in our sample experience both a strong or weak …scal position state and a recession. 20 The fact is that the two states rarely coincide: for the pooled sample, the concurrence of both states occurs around 2 percent of the time. Even for the category with the highest relative frequency -developing economies with a weak …scal state undergoing a recession -the coincidence of these states is very infrequent (at most 3 percent of the time). 21 Second, we perform a number of formal tests that compares the distribution of …scal position (debt-to-GDP ratio) during recessions and expansions. These are reported in the bottom panel of Table 1 . It is clear that any di¤erences -to the extent that they exist -are minimal: for instance, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the expansionary state is 52 percent, compared to 54 percent during recessions. More formally, the t tests all fail to reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erence in means at the standard con…dence levels. In e¤ect, there is little evidence that the distributions of …scal position in our sample di¤er between recessionary and expansionary states.
Our third approach is to estimate …scal multipliers conditional on the …scal position while explicitly controlling for business cycle e¤ects. For that, we replace Equation (2) by the following expression that jointly conditions the model coe¢ cients on both the …scal position and the business cycle state as follows:
where bc is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a recession and 0 for an expansion as determined by the Harding-Pagan (2002) dating algorithm. The IPVAR system now comprises of Equations (1) and (4). Figure 5 presents estimates of the multipliers for di¤erent …scal positions during recessions. Compared with the earlier result ( Figure 3 ), which e¤ectively spans both phases of the business cycle, the magnitude of the multipliers during recessions ( Figure 5 ) is larger for any given level of …scal position. For instance, the point estimate of the long-run multiplier for the strongest …scal position during recessions almost reaches 1.5, while it is less than 1 when conditioned only on the …scal position. This echoes the empirical literature that has argued that multipliers tend to be larger during recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012b; Bachmann and Sims 2012; Candelon and Lieb 2013). Our results show that multipliers remain dependent on …scal position even during recessions: estimated multipliers decline monotonically in debt for all horizons. 22 One important corollary of this result is that the multiplier can be small even during recessions, if the …scal position is weak. This is especially the case in the longer-run, as the implications of a heavier debt burden on private demand ultimately play out. Where the …scal position is especially weak, the multiplier even turns signi…cantly negative. Our central result, therefore, nuances other …ndings that multipliers are larger during recessions than expansions. Conditioning our IPVAR only on the phase of the business cycle, we indeed obtain similar results reported in earlier studies ( Figure 6 ) (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012b). 23 Yet, our results based on the joint conditioning show that, even during recessions, multipliers can be small and even negative if …scal position is weak.
Why Fiscal Positions Matter -Transmission Channels
The key mechanism that could reduce multipliers when …scal positions are weak, especially in the long run, rests on private agents' concerns about …scal sustainability when the government implements expansionary …scal policy. As mentioned earlier, this can operate via reductions in private consumption as households anticipate a larger tax burden in the future (the Ricardian channel), or via reductions in consumption and investment by investors facing an ever-greater borrowing costs (the interest rate channel). In this section, we attempt to assess the relative strength of these two channels.
We …rst consider the Ricardian channel by augmenting the IPVAR system with private consumption, with the model coe¢ cients conditioned on …scal position. For this speci…cation, we order private consumption right after GDP, thus keeping intact the recursive identi…cation scheme of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . Ordering the current account and exchange rates last preserves a domestic macroeconomic bloc in the IPVAR. The conditional impulse responses of private consumption and output to the …scal shock, for both the strong and the weak …scal position, are presented in the left panel of Figure 7 . As before, the strong and the weak …scal positions respectively correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of debt-to-GDP ratio from our sample. We check the robustness of our results by choosing the 25th and 95th percentiles ( Figure A6 in the Appendix).
The results are unambiguous: when the …scal position is strong, private consumption rises following the impact of the …scal shock, peaking around a year after the shock before returning to its initial level. On the other hand, when the …scal position is weak, private consumption falls precipitously and remains depressed for around three years after the …scal shock. During these horizons, the di¤erence in the response of private consumption is also statistically signi…cant, judging from the non-overlapping con…dence bands. The divergence in private consumption responses across strong and weak …scal positions is consistent with the Ricardian channel outlined earlier where households reduce consumption in anticipation of more imminent …scal adjustments during times of high government debt (Sutherland 1997 and Perroti 1999) . 24 Our result on the divergence of private consumption paths provides a new dimension on the debate concerning how private consumption responds to …scal stimulus. Perroti (2005) …nds that private consumption rises in response to a positive …scal shock, while Ramey (2011) shows that private consumption actually declines -a di¤erence which is attributed to the speci…c identi…cation scheme used in these studies. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) reconcile these two contrasting views in terms of monetary policy behavior and argue that once monetary policy is controlled for, …scal policy has expansionary e¤ects on private consumption. Our results, by explicitly showing how a weak …scal position undermines and reverses the response of private consumption, suggest an additional aspect that can help reconcile the con ‡icting results found in the literature.
For the interest rate channel, we would ideally introduce a proxy for sovereign risk, such as the yield spread, directly into our IPVAR system. However, this is precluded by the paucity of credible long-term rates, especially in developing countries, at the quarterly frequency. We thus proceed with our second-best option, which is to augment private investment into the IPVAR system. As in the case of private consumption, private investment is ordered after GDP but before the current account. Since private investment is particularly sensitive to borrowing costs, a reduction in private investment during times of weak …scal position is indicative of the interest rate channel. Figure 7 presents the conditional impulse responses of private investment for both weak and strong …scal positions. 25 The contrast between strong and weak …scal positions for the path of private investment is, again, striking. Investment rises signi…cantly when the …scal position is strong, peaking after around 6 quarters, but remaining sustained through at least 10 quarters. When the …scal position is weak, investment drops sharply after about a year, and never fully recovers, failing to revert even after 5 years. The di¤erence in the impulse responses across strong and weak …scal positions is also statistically signi…cant (barring the initial few quarters). These responses are qualitatively similar to those of private consumption but much larger in magnitude. This suggests that investor concerns about borrowing cost could be an additional channel for dampening the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy.
Robustness Exercises
We consider three exercises to check the robustness of our headline …ndings: (a) an alternative measure of …scal position where we use …scal balances instead of government debt; (b) an alternative dating scheme of the business cycle similar to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) to de…ne recessions as periods with a signi…cant probability of negative output growth; (c) estimating …scal position dependent multipliers while controlling for exchange rate regimes. 26 For the last exercise, we estimate the IPVAR model by jointly conditioning the model coe¢ cients on both the …scal position and an exchange rate regime dummy. The law of motion of the model coe¢ cients then is:
where er is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a …xed exchange rate regime and 0 for a ‡exible exchange rate regime. 27 The measure of …scal position, f s, is taken to be the government debt-to-GDP ratio as in the baseline speci…cation. Table 2 presents the results. The top panel shows the range of estimates of the …scal multipliers for the strongest and weakest …scal positions which, like before, are taken to be …scal balances corresponding to the 10th (weak) and 90th (strong) percentiles from the sample. By and large, our baseline results are qualitatively similar when …scal balances, instead of debt-to-GDP ratios, are used to measure …scal positions. That is, the multipliers are systematically larger for high …scal balances (strong …scal position) than low …scal balances (i.e. weak …scal position). This is true regardless of the horizons considered and when jointly conditioned on the state of the business cycle. The middle panel of Table 2 presents the multipliers using the alternative de…nition of recessions. Our headline result -multipliers depend on the …scal position even during recessions -generally holds, especially at longer horizons. The bottom panel presents the …scal positiondependent multipliers for ‡exible and …xed exhange rates. Consistent with the literature (e.g. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh 2013), for a given …scal position, multipliers are larger in …xed than ‡exible exchange rate regimes. That said, the state dependency on …scal position still holds: multipliers are larger when …scal position is strong than weak irrespective of the exchange rate regime.
Conclusion
We document that …scal multipliers tend to be larger when the …scal position is stronger. For instance, our estimates suggest that the long run multiplier can be as big as unity when the …scal position is strong but it can turn negative when the …scal position is weak. A weak …scal position can undermine …scal multipliers even during recessions. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that weak …scal positions are associated with smaller multipliers through both a Ricardian channel and an interest rate channel.
Future work can usefully focus on two issues. First, while data limitations have precluded a deeper and more direct exploration of the interest rate channel, future research, perhaps with more comprehensive and representative data on yield spreads, can seek to improve our understanding of the interest rate channel. Second, …scal-monetary interactions can be studied using a similar empirical model like ours. In particular, one can evaluate whether monetary policy o¤ers a more e¤ective stabilization tool during times of weak …scal position. 
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Figure A1: Distribution of Fiscal Position
Note: The graph shows the distribution of fiscal position, taken to be the annual government debt-to-GDP ratio, from the sample of advanced and developing economies during the period 1980-2014. 
